I. Introduction
Recent economic studies of trade unionism have departed from the traditional focus on wage policy and have emphasized the influence of collective bargaining on other dimensions of employment relations, including quits, layoffs, fringe benefits, and productivity. Labor unions are interpreted as facilitating the expression of collective worker "voice" as a complement to individual voice and exit strategies that can be adopted by workers acting alone. This new body of theory and evidence suggests a new set of explanations for the distribution of unionism across the economy.
Theories of the union as a monopoly price-maker focus logically on relative wages in union and nonunion jobs and on the determinants of unions' abilities to extend existing union pay scales to unorganized employers. The voice perspective, however, suggests that nonwage characteristics of jobs may influence workers' desires for union representation through their influence on the ease and expense of individual voice and exit strategies. In general, one would expect workers to desire collective means for expressing preferences when exit is costly and when individual expressions of voice are unsuccessful because of the public-goods characteristics of job quality. A number of studies report that jobs with hazardous and otherwise unpleasant conditions are more likely to be unionized than jobs with more desirable working conditions, other things equal (Duncan and Stafford, 1980; Leigh, 1982; Worrall and Butler, 1983; Hirsch and Berger, 1984) . These studies contain no direct information on worker preferences, however, and so are unable to ascertain whether the observed association between working conditions and unionism is causal or due to unobserved third factors. There could be less unionization in safer jobs, for example, because the major growth in employment in the relatively safe service industries occurred after the historical surge of unionization during the 1930s and 1940s.
This study focuses on the influence of job characteristics on worker desires for union representation using three data sets that contain explicit information on preferences. It analyzes the desires for union representation by current union as well as current nonunion workers. Both subjective and objective measures of job characteristics are employed. Section II discusses a number of sample selection and variable measurement issues that have plagued previous studies. The econometric specification and data sources are presented in the following two sections. Findings on the total and partial correlations among working conditions and worker desires for union representation are presented in Section V. A final section discusses the implications of the findings for theories of union growth and for public policy.
II. Sample Selection and Variable Measurement
Those who study working conditions, union status, and worker preferences face two principal problems: sample selection biases and the appropriate choice of working condition variables.
Sample Selection. Most studies of worker attitudes toward union representation have been limited to samples of current nonunion workers. Kochan and Helfman (1981) and Farber (1983) employ the 1977 Quality of Employment Survey (QES), which does not ask workers currently covered by union representation how they would vote if a representation election were held again. Hills (1985) employs the 1978 wave of the Young Men's National Longitudinal Survey (NLS), which asks both union and nonunion workers for their preferences, but he deliberately limits his analysis of the nonunion sample. Leigh (1985) does employ the full NLS men's sample, but he does not examine the role of working conditions. In principle, nonunion data samples can provide an unbiased answer to the question of whether nonunion workers in hazardous and otherwise disagreeable jobs are more likely to vote for union representation than nonunion workers in safer jobs. But they cannot answer the more general question concerning the extent to which working conditions influence worker attitudes. By selecting respondents for the sample based on the values of an endogenous variable (current union status), they tend to bias toward zero the estimated coefficients on the
